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LEVERAGED BUYOUT, MANAGEMENT
BUYOUT, AND GOING PRIVATE CORPORATE
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS: INSIDER
TRADING OR EFFICIENT MARKET
ECONOMICS?
I. Introduction
According to one commentator, a particularly troublesome form
of insider trading abuse' has developed in the past decade without
full public .discussion of its ethics or its legality. 2 This abuse has
spurred significant commentary.' Corporate control transactions of this
type, known as insider leveraged buyouts," management buy-
1. For a discussion of insider trading and its historical development, see infra
notes 26-134 and accompanying text.
2. Stein, Going Private is Unethical, FORTUNE, Nov. 11, 1985, at 169 [hereinafter
cited as Stein]. One commentator asserts that "[i]nsider leveraged buyouts are the
newest wrinkles in the endless efforts of promoters and entrepreneurs to misuse
the system of public corporations. It is time for them to be ironed out." Id. at
170.
3. Since the Stein article, other concerns have been raised, not the least of
which is that leveraged buyouts are "risky ventures" which may one day collapse,
hurting both business and the economy. See Wayne, Buyouts Altering Face of
Corporate America, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Wayne].
4. A leveraged buyout (often referred to in economic jargon as "LBO") is
any acquisition of a company which leaves the acquired operating entity with a
greater than traditional debt-to-worth ratio. LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 3 (S. Diamond
ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]. Such buyouts are examples of corporate
takeovers, and get their name from the enormous leverage, or borrowing, needed
to finance them. Wayne, supra note 3, at 1, col. 3. In a typical leveraged buyout,
a small group of executives and financiers borrows heavily to purchase a company,
and then repays this debt with cash from the acquired company or by selling some
of the company's assets. Id. Several types of financing may be employed to structure
leveraged buyouts including "secured financing" and "unsecured financing." "Se-
cured financing" occurs when the assets of the acquired corporation are used to
collateralize the debt. The difference between the secured debt and the purchase
price is normally covered by a combination of equity contribution by the investing
group and promissory notes held by the seller. Diamond, supra, at 3. "Unsecured
financing" usually "involves some combination of venture capital, 'mezzanine debt'
(subordinated debt, generally with an equity kicker [sic], and senior debt (generally
owing to banks) aggregating to the total purchase price." Id. at 4.
There are also several types of leveraged buyout transactions including "asset
acqusitions" and "stock acquisitions."
Asset acquisitions involve the formation of a new corporation (or uti-
lization of an existing corporation), which acquires the assets of the
target company. Asset acquisitions are generally easier to document, but
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outs,5 and going private,6 have totaled billions of dollars.' On their
face, these deals, regardless of their specifics, raise the most basic
they often raise significant tax issues which can affect the purchase price.
If the acquired operation is a corporate division rather than a separate
corporation, an asset acquisition is the only available type of transaction.
Stock acquisitions take many forms: they can include stock redemptions,
tender offers, pure stock acquisitions, and reverse mergers. They generally
involve the most complex structuring and the greatest number of legal
issues. They are most commonly used if the target company is publicly
held or if an asset acquisition will result in significant tax issues.
Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). For a more detailed discussion of leveraged buyout
transaction structures, see infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
5. Management buyouts, which are leveraged buyouts undertaken by the target
firm's own management, are evolving into offensive weapons. Greenwald, The
Popular Game of Going Private, TnE,, Nov. 4, 1985, at 54 [hereinafter cited as
Greenwald]; see supra note 4 and infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
"[Management buyouts] can be viewed as offers made by internal raiders .... .
Greenwald, supra, at 54 (quoting Alfred Rappaport, Professor of Accounting at
Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management). To begin the transaction,
management typically looks to the advice of financial and investment experts.
Management may come away with 20%, with big investors getting ownership rights
for as much as 45% and with the remainder going to the investment firm that
brought the partners together. Id. at 55.
6.
Going private, whether effected through an issuer's tender offer, by a
leveraged buyout, or simply by merger with a dummy corporation, is a
process for eliminating public stockholders by acquiring their stock for
a price (generally in cash) that is somewhat higher than the prevailing
market price. On the assumption that such transactions are unilateral
and coercive-actually coercive to the extent they are mergers; and ef-
fectively coercive in the case of initial buy backs by tender offers which
threaten the market liquidity of the public's shares-they are likely to
force precisely the same inequality as would a disparate distribution on
dissolution. The controller keeps the "real" assets and the minority
receives cash.
Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reor-
ganizations, 71 CALIf. L. REv. 1072, 1091-92 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brudney].
"The arguments for going private focus on the 'savings' which the process effects.
The essential contention is that by reducing costs, going private increases the
profitability and therefore the value of the corporation." Id. at 1092 (footnote
omitted); see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 987, 1006-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden]; Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 729-30 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Easterbrook & Fischel]; Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal
Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BuFFALo L. Rav. 141,
143 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Solomon]; Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law,
34 U. MIAMi L. REv. 959, 978-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wolfson]; Note,
Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 907 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Going Private].
But see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1366-67 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein].
7. In 1984, a record $18.6 billion was spent on 247 leveraged buyouts, and
1985's frenetic pace was expected to top that. Wayne, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2;
see infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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questions of whether security holders are getting the legal and ethical
protection they require and, by law, deserve.'
It is a fundamental precept of the theory of going private that
different groups of security holders9 of the same class 0 will be
treated differently." Furthermore, the arm's-length bargaining 2 that
8. See Stein, supra note 2, at 169; see also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
6 (going private should be prohibited since it results in a high chance that public
stockholders will be treated unfairly). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
6 (banning going private transactions would be irrational). For a discussion of the
polarized positions taken by Brudney and Chirelstein, on the one hand, and
Easterbrook and Fischel, on the other, see infra notes 213-17 and accompanying
text.
9. "Shareholder" means the person in whose name shares are registered in
the records of a corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to the extent of
the rights granted by a nominee certificate on file with a corporation. REVISED
MODEL BUsINESS CORP. ACT, § 1.40(22) (1985). Once one sells all of his securities
in a corporation, he may no longer claim that he is a security holder of that
corporation. See American Casualty Co. v. M.S.L. Indus., Inc., Howard Indus.
Div., 406 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1969).
10.
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not identical
with respect to the rights and interest which they convey in the control,
profits, and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered
to have more than one class of stock. Thus, a difference as to voting
rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock
will disqualify a corporation. However, if two or more groups of shares
are identical in every respect except that each group has the right to
elect members of the board of directors in a number proportionate to
the number of shares in each group, they are considered one class of
stock.
Pollack v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added) (quoting
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959)).
11. R.W. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 615 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
HAMILTON]; see also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 6, at 1358 ("[flreezeouts
obviously differ from arm's-length mergers in that all the members of the same
class of stockholders do not receive identical treatment: the controlling stockholders
retain their equity but force the minority, the public investors, to accept cash or
debt") (emphasis in original). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 729
n.83 (Rule 13e-3 requires statement regarding the fairness or the unfairness of the
transaction).
12. "To be at arm's length ... a transaction must be between parties with
'adverse economic interests.' " Creme Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 515,
520 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Campana Corp. v. Harrison, 114 F.2d 400, 408 (7th
Cir. 1940)). An illustration of what is not at arm's-length is a freezeout, the essential
elements of which "include a control group which is able to propose and effectuate
corporate action (and which remains in control after the transaction) and one or
more shareholders ... whose interests in the company are eliminated as a result
of the transaction." Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines on Going Private,
37 Bus. LAW. 313, 315-16 (1981) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines
on Going Private].
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is present in the majority of intercorporate transactions is absent."
Accordingly, going private transactions are often attended by un-
certainty and legal risks.' 4 For these reasons, among others, sub-
stantive and administrative law are beginning to place limitations
on the ability of corporations to engage in going private transac-
tions.1" For example, under recent federal securities regulations, man-
agement must publicize its opinion as to the "fairness" or "unfairness"
of certain going private transactions. 16
Yet, there are those who question the effectiveness of these lim-
itations. 7 One commentator argues that persons who participate in
a leveraged buyout have better knowledge of the true value of a
parcel of real estate, an invention, a pending contract, or a com-
petitor's problems than do the security holders to whom they make
their leveraged buyout offer." This commentator concludes that those
who initiate leveraged buyout, management buyout, and going private
transactions are inevitably acting on inside information for profit.' 9
This Note first examines the historical development and modern
application of judicial decisions and statutes concerning insider trad-
ing. 20 This Note then discusses the phenomena of leveraged buyout,
management buyout, and going private transactions with emphasis
on their structure,2' fairness to security holders, 22 and a possible
breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders in the case of management
buyouts.23 Following a discussion of recommendations and policy
arguments proferred by other commentators and scholars, 24 this Note
recommends that a remedy be afforded to minority security holders
13. Guidelines on Going Private, supra note 12, at 313.
14. Id. The potential use of inside information in going private transactions
presents one such legal risk; i.e. violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of insider trading, see infra
notes 204-08 and, accompanying text.
15. Guidelines on Going Private, supra, note 12, at 313.
16. Schedule 13E-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 8, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985). For a detailed discussion and commentary on Rule
13e, see infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
17. For one such commentary, see Stein, supra note 2, at 169-70.
18. Id.
19. Id. These claims are addressed in detail infra notes 204-08 and accompanying
text.
20. See infra notes 26-134 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 168-87 and accompanying text and notes 190-98 and ac-
companying text.
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIV
19861 LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 689
who feel they are being grossly undercompensated, while allowing
leveraged buyout, management buyout, and going private transactions
to continue in such a way that the principle of fiduciary duty remains
untarnished .25
II. Insider Trading: The Rules of the Game and the Players
Who Make and Break Them
A. Historical Overview of Insider Trading
Before the enactment of the federal securities laws, 26 the doctrine
of "caveat emptor" generally applied to securities transactions just
as it did in other purchase and sale transactions: "competent adult
purchasers were deemed to be able to fend for themselves." ' 27 Al-
25. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
26. S. GOLDBERG, SEC TRADING RESTRICTIONS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR INSIDERS 1 (1973) (discussing when insider may trade on inside information)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDBERG]. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-
77(aa) (1982), was the first law regulating securities. This act has two basic objectives:
(1) to provide investors with material financial and other information
concerning new issues of securities offered for sale to the public; and
(2) to prohibit fraudulent sales of securities. Its scope, however, is strictly
limited, for jurisdiction is always tied to some use of the mails or of
interstate facilities to accomplish a forbidden transaction.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 40
(5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as SECURITIES REGULATION].
The act naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of the Twenties
that was followed by the market crash of 1929. Even before the inau-
guration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the United States, a
spectacularly illuminating investigation of the nature of this financing
was being undertaken by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
under the direction of its able counsel, Ferdinand D. Pecora. That
Committee ... indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably
in imposing those essential fiduciary standards that should govern persons
whose function it was to handle other people's money. Investment bankers,
brokers and dealers, corporate directors, accountants, all found themselves
the object of criticism so severe that the American public lost much of
its faith in professions that had theretofore been regarded with a respect
that had approached awe. As the criticism mounted, doubts as to the
value of the very system of private enterprise were generated, and a wide
demand was prevalent for the institution of procedures of governmental
control that would in essence have created a capital issues bureaucracy
to control not only the manner in which securities could be issued but
the very right of any enterprise to tap the capital market.
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 29, 30 (1959-60) [hereinafter cited as Landis].
27. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 1. In an analogous context, the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 comment a (1965), sums up the prevailing view regarding
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though the doctrine retains its vitality in some areas,2 it no longer
applies to securities transactions. 29
The prohibition against "insider trading," 3 the rule that certain
the liability of a vendor of land:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was that,
in the absence of express agreement, the vendor of land was not liable
to his vendee, or a fortiori to any other person, for the condition of
the land existing at the time of transfer. As to sales of land this rule
has retained much of its original force, and the implied warranties which
have grown up around the sale of chattels never have developed. This
is perhaps because great importance always has been attached to the
deed of conveyance, which is taken to represent the full agreement of
the parties, and to exclude all other terms and liabilities. The vendee is
required to make his own inspection of the premises and the vendor is
not responsible to him for their defective condition, existing at the time
of transfer.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d
303, 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 384 (1985) (where corporations of
roughly equal resources contract for sale of industrial property, especially where
dispute is over condition of land rather than a structure, caveat emptor remains
the rule under Pennsylvania law); M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES
OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n), at 37 (4th ed. 1984) ("in the ordinary sale of realty
this doctrine not only applies, it flourishes"). By 1933, the desire to eliminate the
dangers created by the doctrine of caveat emptor in the securities markets was
increasingly prominent, as evidenced by Franklin D. Roosevelt's message to Congress
on March 29, 1933:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained
or that the properties which they represent will earn profit. There is,
however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity
and information, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933) (remarks of Franklin D. Roosevelt).
28. See supra note 27.
29. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 1. For illustrations of safeguards protecting
against application of caveat emptor in securities transactions, see the discussion
of insider trading case law infra notes 72-125 and accompanying text.
30. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; see
also Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 54
S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1219 (1981) ("[i]nsider trading" refers to the practice of
trading securities on both organized stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market
based upon material nonpublic information) [hereinafter cited as Wang]; Note, An
Outsider Looks at Insider Trading: Chiarella, Dirks, and the Duty to Disclose
Material Nonpublic Information, 12 FoRDHum URn. L.J. 777, 777 (1984) (federal
securities laws prohibit insider trading) [hereinafter cited as An Outsider Looks at
Insider Trading].
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persons with knowledge of material nonpublic information" about
an issuer or its securities must either refrain from trading or disclose
that information, is now a basic principle of antifraud ideology
under the federal securities laws.32 The pillars of the law on insider
trading are section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193433
and Rule 10b-534 enacted thereunder.
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, the relevant portions
of that history support the conclusion that section 10(b) was intended
to address practices involving some element of scientela5 and should
31. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
32. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1; see Wang, supra note 30, at 1219; GOLDBERG,
supra note 26, at 7 ("[a]n insider in possession of material inside information may
avoid any risk of Rule lob-5 liability by foregoing any trading"); An Outsider
Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 778 ("[a]t the heart of the prohibition
against insider trading is the concept known as the 'abstain or disclose' rule").
33. The text of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982).
34. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
35. Scienter is the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). In Ernst, the Supreme Court held that
a private cause of action for damages will not lie under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of "scienter." Id. The Court noted that
"[although verbal formulations of the standard to be applied have varied, several
Courts of Appeals have held in substance that negligence alone is sufficient for
civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Id. at n.12; see, e.g., White
v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (standard of "flexible duty"); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967) (negligence sufficient for cause of
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not be read to impose liability for conduct that is merely negligent.3 6
The 1934 Act was principally intended to protect traders in se-
curities against manipulation of securities prices by regulating se-
curities transactions on the exchanges and in the over-the-counter
markets3 7 and by requiring periodic reporting by issuers listing their
action), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
637 (7th Cir. 1963) (scienter not required). Other courts of appeals have held that
scienter is necessary for such an action to lie. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974) ("scienter or conscious fault"), cert. denied, 422
U.S 1007 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973)
("willful or reckless disregard" for truth). But negligent conduct has seldom been
involved in decisions announcing that some form of negligence suffices for civil
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting
in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); see Bueklo, Scienter and Rule lob-5,
67 Nw. U.L. Rv. 562, 568-70 (1972). In Ernst, the Court stated that "the term
scienter refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. The Court did not address the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 nor did it consider the question whether scienter is a necessary
element in an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. Id.;
cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) ("Con-
gress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud
or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to require proof of intent to injure and
actual injury to the client").
36. This is evidenced by an explanation of the provision that became section
10(b) by a spokesman for the drafters, Thomas G. Corcoran:
Of course subsection (c) [referring to § 9(c) of H.R. 7852 which would
become section 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.
I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative
devices.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
This explanation of section 10(b) has been the basis for judicial determinations
regarding the scienter requirement:
The section was described rightly as a "catchall" clause to enable the
Commission "to deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices." It is
difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator
would use these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 203 (footnote omitted).
37.
An estimated 20,000 or so "unlisted" securities are traded solely in the
"over-the-counter" or "OTC" market. The OTC market has no physical
location, and has historically been characterized by virtually complete
freedom of entry. There are no formal procedures for commencing or
terminating trading in a particular security. Any broker-dealer registered
with the SEC can act as a dealer (buying and selling to others as principal)
or broker (buying or selling for others as their agent) or both in any
[Vol. XIV
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securities on national securities exchanges."
The crux of the prohibition of insider trading is the "disclose or
refrain" rule.3 9 This rule asserts that persons in possession of material
nonpublic information must either disclose that information or refrain
from using such information as the basis for their trading.4
The classification 4' of the party in question is a crucial factor in
OTC security. Market-making in OTC stocks ranges from sporadic ac-
tivities of individual dealers in inactive local stocks to continuous com-
petition among thirty or more dealers in the largest, most active issues.
Prior to 1971, the only formalized means of communication of quo-
tations in the OTC market was through the publication of daily "sheets",
listing the bid and asked prices of each dealer in each stock at the close
of the previous day. On February 8, 1971, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) put into operation an automated quotation
system-NASDAQ-by which continuously updated price quotations are
displayed on a real-time basis on cathode ray terminals located in sub-
scribers' offices.
NASDAQ is at present only a quotation system. After obtaining a
quotation, a subscriber must consummate the transaction by telephone
communication with the market-maker. Nor does the NASDAQ system
provide reports of transactions, although suggestions have been made
that NASDAQ could serve as the nucleus of an automated system for
the execution and clearance of securities transactions . . . . NASDAQ is
presently furnishing to over 800 subscribers, with approximately 60,000
terminals, quotations of over 394 marketmakers in approximately 3,000
securities which meet NASD requirements for inclusion in the system.
SECURITiES REGULATION, supra note 26, at 5-6.
38. Rule 12g-l, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides
that listing of securities on a national securities exchange is no longer a prerequisite
to the registration requirement.
An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to register any class of
equity securities pursuant to section 12(g)(l) if on the last day of its
most recent fiscal year the issuer had total assets not exceeding $3,000,000
and, with respect to a foreign private issuer, such securities were not
quoted in an automated interdealer quotation system.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-l (1985); see Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195; Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,
492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[t]he basic intent of section 10(b) and Rule
lob-5 and indeed, of the Exchange Act, is to protect investors and instill confidence
in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings"); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 1 n.l (referring to "disclose or refrain"
rule as "abstain-or-disclose" rule); Brudney, supra note 6, at 1-2; An Outsider
Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 778-79; cf. Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("well known and well established
equitable principles governing fiduciary relationships" must control).
40. See GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 7. "A fundamental purpose, common to
these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry." Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186 (emphasis in original).
41. In this regard, "classification" refers to categories such as corporate di-
1986]
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determining whether there exists a duty to disclose material nonpublic
information under the disclose or refrain rule.4 2 One group subject
to the rule, as a matter of both legislative history and traditional
law, is the issuer's insiders, i.e., directors, officers, and executive
employees a.4  Their fiduciary duty to their corporation and to the
corporation's security holders prohibits these insiders from trading
on material nonpublic information." One commentator has noted
that to allow such individuals to profit despite their fiduciary duty
would be both inequitable4l and unfair."
rectors, corporate officers, employees, outsiders, or others standing in some re-
lationship with the firm. See generally Langevoort, supra note 30, at 19-21.
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (corporate
insiders, e.g., officers, directors and controlling stockholders, traditionally held to
have special obligation for protection of others). For a further discussion of Cady,
Roberts, see infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
44. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 19-20.
[T]he affirmative disclosure rule established in these cases is best seen
as the legal judgment that a person in a position of responsibility for
the property or welfare of another should act in that capacity solely for
the best interest of the beneficiary-in other words, a rule derived from
the fiduciary's duty of loyalty.
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 5. See generally Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37
CALiF. L. REv. 539 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Scott]. The fiduciary relationship
has been held to apply even where the parties do not trust each other. See Johnson
v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938); Langevoort, supra note 30, at
20 (insiders acting as agent with corporation as principal have fiduciary duty to
corporation and derivatively to its shareholders).
45. An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 785. Other
commentators have agreed:
Here, the basis in equity for the open-market abstain-or-disclose rule is
plain. When an insider buys immediately before the announcement of
good news or sells just before bad, his profit arises by virtue of his
fiduciary status and the resulting access to the nonpublic information
that created the opportunity for low-risk wealth. Requiring public dis-
closure by the insider in the open-market situation furthers a significant
objective underlying the fiduciary disclosure rule-that of preventing
unjust enrichment.
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 19; see also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv.
322, 344 (1979) ("[tlhere is no reason for them to be entitled to trade for their own
benefit on the basis of such information, particularly when, as we have noted,
permission to do so will enable, if not indeed tempt, them to disserve the corporation
and all its stockholders") (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages].
46. An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 785; Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at 344. The concept of
fiduciary duty is of particular significance in the context of leveraged buyout,
management buyout, and going private transactions which are discussed infra notes
135-208 and accompanying text. See Note, Corporate Morality and Management
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Although the federal securities laws do not distinguish between
various types of material nonpublic information, 47 several commen-
tators have drawn a distinction between two particular types: cor-
porate [issuer] information and market information. 48 Corporate
information is information that emerges from within the corporation
or that affects the price of the issuer's securities because of its
reflection of the corporation's expected earnings or assets. 49 Examples
of corporate information include the imminent reduction of divi-
dends, 0 the discovery of a potential mineral deposit,5 ' or the report
of a decline in earnings for a particular period. 2 Market information,
which emerges from outside the corporation, has been defined several
Buyouts, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1015, 1017 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Morality) (management buyout transactions may violate the fiduciary obligation of
management to administer corporate affairs exclusively for the benefit of the
corporation's shareholders and the corporation itself).
47. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 281-
83 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages,
supra note 45, at 331-32 ("[tjhe antifraud provisions by their terms and by their
history do not distinguish between noncorporate and corporate information or
outsiders and insiders" (footnotes omitted)).
48. See, e.g., Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note
45, at 329 (corporate information comes from within corporation or affects price
of corporate stock; market information concerns transactions in corporation's se-
curities that will impact on their future price); Langevoort, supra note 30, at 42
(corporate information relates to intrinsic value of the issuer, primarily its business
and operations; market information may include information coming from bidder
in planned tender offer).
49. See Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at
329; Langevoort, supra note 30, at 42 ("[c]orporate information concerns 'infor-
mation relating to the intrinsic value of the issuer, primarily its business and
operations .. .' ").
50. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (discussed infra notes 72-79 and
accompanying text).
51. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (discussed infra notes 80-87 and accompanying
text).
52. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974) (prospective managing underwriter and its directors, officers and
employees divulged materially adverse inside information regarding decline in issuer'.
earnings).
Examples of corporate information include knowledge of a significant
discovery of natural resources, a research and development breakthrough,
a rush of new orders, or a potential merger, any of which can be expected
to cause a rise.in the price of a corporation's stock upon public disclosure.
Corporate information can also be adverse, such as knowledge of cancelled
orders, nonacceptance of new products, a newly computed decline in
earnings, the passing of a dividend, or the writeoff of a failed venture.
In the latter cases, the corporation's stock price can be expected to decline
-once the news Feaches the market.
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at 329 n.31.
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ways, with some commentators giving it a macroeconomic character
while others give it a more narrow and rigid interpretation."
Regardless of whether the nonpublic information is corporate or
market, the information must be material 4 for there to be a violation
of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 5 Materiality,
in the context of the federal securities laws, often has been defined
in major cases and in legal commentaries. 6 In general, information
is considered material if a reasonable person would attach importance
to it or if the information is likely to have substantial market impact.5 7
Reliance may be presumed if the information is shown to be ma-
terial. 8
53. Compare Langevoort, supra note 30, at 42 (" 'market' information (a
residual category of noncorporate information)") with Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at 329 ("[m]arket information concerns
transactions in a corporation's securities that will have an impact on their future
price quite apart from expected changes in the corporation's earnings or assets").
54. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976)
("[slo long as the misstatement or omission was material, the causal relation between
violation and injury is sufficiently established . . ."); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("[aln insider's duty to disclose
information or his duty to abstain from dealing in his company's securities arises
only in 'those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are
reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security
if [the extraordinary situation is] disclosed'." (quoting Fleischer, Securities Trading
and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (1965)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
55. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
57. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 4; see Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849
("[tihe basic test of materiality ... is whether a reasonable man would attach
importance [to the information] . . . in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question") (emphasis in original) (citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)); Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("a fact
is proved to be material when it is more probable than not that a significant
number of traders would have wanted to know it before deciding to deal in the
security at the time and price in question"); In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633, 642 (1971) ("[almong the factors to be considered in determining
whether information is material . . . are the degree of its specificity, the extent to
which it differs from information previously publicly disseminated, and its reliability
in light of its nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received").
58. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 43 ("[ulsually the information is suf-
ficiently material that the insider's reliance can be presumed" (footnote omitted));
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule Job-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584, 587 (1975); An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note
30, at 784. But see GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 5 ("plaintiff's harm must take
the form of pecuniary losses, before liability will be imposed"). In this regard,
"nonpublic" information "refers to information that investors may not lawfully
acquire without the consent of the source. It also includes information which,
although it may lawfully be disseminated, is not yet generally available." Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at 322 n.2.
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B. Section 16(b) and Short-swing Profits
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is closely
related to Rule lOb-5.59 Section 16(b) is a rather technical provision
authorizing an issuer, or any of its security holders suing derivatively,
to recapture profits that arise from short-swing trading by certain
insiders in the issuer's equity securities. 6' Although both Rule lOb-
5 and section 16(b) "are directed at the informational advantage
inherent in insider status, ' 62 a major difference exists between the
two provisions. Rule lOb-5 imposes liability where the actual misuse
of material inside information is proved. 63 Section 16(b), however,
is applied mechanically without inquiry as to whether inside infor-
mation was used.64
Section 16(b) applies to officers, directors, and shareholders owning
more than ten percent of a class of registered equity securities. 65 It
59. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in relevant
part:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
60. Section 16(b) specifies a short-swing trading period to be "any period of
less than six months." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). A period of less than six months
is usually defined as six calendar months less one full period from midnight to
midnight. For example, "if securities purchased on January 1st are sold on June
30th, the sale is not considered to be made within a period of less than six months
from the purchase." See GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 14.
61. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 13; Langevoort, supra note 30, at 3 n.7
("[s]ection 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act .. .prohibits short-swing profits
by certain insiders, a rule designed to reach certain insider trading practices").
62. See GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 14.
63. See supra notes 34, 56-58 and accompanying text.
64. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.) (rejecting defen-
dant's contention that liability results only for profits from a proven unfair use of
inside information), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); GOLDBERG, supra note
26, at 14 ("Section 16(b) is designed to apply irrespective of whether misuse of
material inside information can be shown"); Langevoort, supra note 30, at 3 n.7
("[Iliability does not depend on any showing that the insider actually possessed
any material nonpublic information").
65. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591
n.21 (1973); see GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 14.
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provides a cause of action for recovery of profits realized from a
purchase and sale or a sale and purchase of the issuer's equity
securities6 within a period of less than six months.6 7 Those having
a cause of action under section 16(b) include the issuer and, if the
issuer fails or refuses to sue, the security holders suing derivatively.6
Since its scope is relatively narrow, section 16(b) does not provide
a complete or effective remedy for all insider trading abuses. 69 It
does, however, "evidence a congressional policy against insider trad-
ing." ' 70 The application of section 16(b) is limited due to difficulties
of proof, not because of a judgment permitting trading that is not
expressly covered. 71
C. Major Developments in Insider Trading Case Law
Although many cases have dealt with insider trading, including
early common law cases, 72 several decisions are at the forefront of
66. "Purchases and sales of convertible securities will always be matched with
purchases and sales of securities into which the convertible securities can be con-
verted." GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 18.
67. See id. at 14.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). It is significant to note that the SEC has no
powers of enforcement under section 16(b). See id. Liability may only be asserted
in a suit brought by a security holder suing on behalf of the issuer or by the
issuer itself. Id.
It is well settled that purchases resulting in a person's ownership of more
than 10% of a class of equity securities and sales reducing a person's
holdings below 10% are considered purchases and sales within the meaning
of Section 16(b). In other words, if Mr. X, who already owns 5% of
a class of registered equity securities, purchases an additional 6% in
June, raising his holdings above 10%, and then sells 4% of his holdings
in July, reducing his holdings below 10%, Mr. X will be treated as a
principal shareholder both at the time of purchase and sale; and any
profits realized by Mr. X as a result of the transactions will have to be
disgorged.
GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 17.
69. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 3 n.7.
70. See id.
71. Id.; see also Kern, 411 U.S. at 594 n.26 ("[bly far the greater weight of
authority is to the effect that a 'pragmatic' approach to § 16(b) will best serve
the statutory goals" (citations omitted)).
72. See An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 791; see, e.g.,
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (defendant fraudulently concealed from
plaintiff's agent facts affecting value of stock sold and delivered); Goodwin v.
Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933) (no actionable wrong by defendant
buyer in not disclosing to plaintiff seller that geologist's report was promising and
thus stock price would likely rise); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d
531 (1932) (action by former owner of corporate shares to recover damages from
president of corporation for breach of duty of loyalty to shareholder because
president purchased shares for much less than their value without making full
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the history of insider trading." Some of these cases, which are most
germane to the topic of this Note, will be reviewed.
1. In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
In In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 74 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) addressed the duties a broker has after he receives
nonpublic information concerning a company's dividend action from
a director employed by the same brokerage firm. 75 The decision was
particularly significant because the SEC based its holding on statutory
rather than common law. 76 In this case, a brokerage firm partner
received a message from a director of Curtiss-Wright that the dividend
was to be cut pursuant to a vote of the board of directors. 77 Without
hesitation, the broker placed orders to sell Curtiss-Wright stock on
behalf of some of his customers; these sales were consummated
before news of the dividend cut was available to the general public.78
The SEC noted that although the broker, based on the facts, was
not a corporate insider, 79 the antifraud provisions still applied because
these provisions are "not [meant] to be circumscribed by fine dis-
tinctions and rigid classifications." 80 The SEC held:
[Tihe obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such in-
disclosure of facts pertinent to transaction). For analyses of these cases, see Brudney,
Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1962);
Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-)Ob-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
Prospects for Rule X-IOb-5].
73. See infra notes 74-125 and accompanying text.
74. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
75. Id.
76. The Commission noted that "[tlhis is a case of first impression and one
of signal importance in our administration of the Federal securities acts." Id.
77. Id. at 908-10.
78. Id. at 909. For a detailed discussion of the "disclose or refrain rule," see
supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
79. The Commission defined' "corporate insiders" as "officers, directors, and
controlling stockholders." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
80. Id. (footnote omitted); see Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434,
436 (2d Cir. 1943) (securities legislation does not fail for vagueness), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 786 (1944); The Prospects for Rule X-JOb-5, supra note 72, at 1145 ("[tjhe
purpose of the Securities Acts is to protect investors generally").
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formation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. '
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
The prohibition against insider trading continued in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 where materiality was the key element in de-
termining liability. 3 Officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. engaged in
extensive purchases of its securities84 after learning that one of the
company's properties showed potential for abundant ore discovery. 5
The Supreme Court held that "[w]hether predicated on traditional
fiduciary concepts . . . or on the 'special facts' doctrine, . .
[Rule 10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information. "86 The
Court established the basic test of materiality as being "whether a
reasonable man would attach importance ... in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question ' 87 and added that
"[tihis, of course, encompasses any fact '. . . which in reasonable
and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corpo-
ration's stock or securities .. ,,"' The Court ordered the defendants
to disgorge their ill-gained profits to a court-supervised fund. 89
81. 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnote omitted).
82. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
83. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
84. Between November 12, 1963 and March 31, 1964, acquisitions totaled 7,100
shares of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock and 12,300 call options to purchase such stock.
The price per share ranged from 17.75 to 25. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at
843-44; see GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 85-86.
85. On November 12, 1963, a drill core of 655 feet was extracted for analysis.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843. A chief geologist for the company (who
was later to be a defendant in the action) examined the core. Id. It was eventually
assayed as containing an average metal content of 1.1807o copper, 8.260o zinc, and
3.94% ounces of silver per ton over the length of the core which was 602 feet.
Id. These results were so remarkable that none of the five expert witnesses "had
ever seen or heard of a comparable initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal
deposit." Id. The trial court concluded that there was "no doubt that the drill
core of K-55-1 was unusually good and that it excited the interest and speculation
of those who knew about it." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262,
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
86. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)).
88. Id. (emphasis in original); List, 340 F.2d at 462 (quoting Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)).
89. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Langevoort, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing fraud on mar-
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3. In re Investors Management Co.
In In re Investors Management Co.,90 another major case evi-
dencing the prohibition of insider trading, an aircraft manufacturer
obtained the services of a broker-dealer who was acting as the
principal underwriter for the manufacturer's proposed debenture
issue. 9' After a forecast of the manufacturer's earnings for the current
year were made public, the manufacturer disclosed to the broker-
dealer that the actual figures were substantially less.92 The broker-
dealer's underwriting department made this disclosure known to
members of its sales department who then informed agents of major
institutional clients of the discrepancy. 93 Before the revised earnings
estimate was generally made available to the public, the institutions
sold large amounts of the manufacturer's stock. 94 The SEC held
that, on such facts, the appropriate test for determining liability is
"whether the recipient knew or had reason to know that the in-
formation was non-public and had been obtained improperly by
selective revelation or otherwise." 95 If such information is material,
ketplace). It has been suggested that the antifraud provisions obligate a corporation
to disclose information regarding its affairs at some point in time, notwithstanding
the fact that the mandated system does not require the disclosure of that information
at that time and the firm is not contemplating any securities transactions. Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at 336; see Financial
Indus. Fund v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 100-02 (10th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 850 n.12; Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Bauman, Rule lob-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative
Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935, 937 (1979). But see Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209, 221 n.10 (1977) (expressly refusing to decide whether such disclosure is
required), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). As pointed out by Judge Friendly
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, scienter may be the appropriate test in order to establish
a defendant's culpability for violation of this disclosure obligation. See Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 866-68; Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages,
supra note 45, at 337 n.58.
90. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
91. Id. at 635-36.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 636.
94. Id. Between June 21, 1966 and June 23, 1966, respondents sold a total of
133,400 shares of Douglas stock from existing long positions, which constituted
virtually all of their holdings of Douglas stock, and sold about 21,100 shares, for
an aggregate price of more than $13,300,000. Id. On June 22, 1966, the price of
Douglas stock reached a high of 90.50, but, by October it declined to a low of
30. Id.
95. Id. at 643. The SEC specifically rejected the following claim:
[N]o violation can be found unless it is shown that the recipient himself
occupied a special relationship with the issuer or insider corporate source
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one who obtains such information falls within the restraints of section
10(b) and Rule l0b-5.9
Thus, in Investors Management, as in Cady, Roberts and Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the persons who effected the transactions, as well as
those who participated in the transactions by passing information
to those effecting the transactions, were held to have violated Rule
lOb-5.97
4. Chiarella v. United States
The law on insider trading, as evidenced by Cady, Roberts, Texas
Gulf Sulphur, and Investors Management, underwent a formidable
revamping when the United States Supreme Court decided Chiarella
v. United States.9 In Chiarella, a financial printing firm employee
ascertained the identities of companies that were the targets of
contemplated tender offers and purchased stock in those companies. 99
He then awaited the public announcement of the takeover attempts
and sold the stock immediately thereafter, harvesting a substantial
profit.' °° He was convicted of a criminal violation'0 1 of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.102 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the conviction based upon the "disclose or refrain rule."'' 3
giving him access to non-public information, or, in the absence of such
relationship, that he had actual knowledge that the information was
disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty not to reveal it.
Id.
96. Id. at 644. The SEC stated that "one who obtains possession of material,
non-public corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a
corporate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to other
investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within
the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions." Id.
97. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text. See generally J. BOLAND,
WALL STREET'S INSmERS (1985) (discussing general case law in insider trading
context); An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30 (detailed discussion
of insider trading cases).
98. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. Chiarella realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course
of 14 months. Subsequently, the SEC began an investigation of his trading activities.
Id.
101. SEC v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see Langevoort, supra
note 30, at 11 n.40. See generally Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic
Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211 (1980) (discussing Chiarella in detail).
102. For the complete text of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see supra notes 33-
34.
103. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980). The court ruled that "falnyone-corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to
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The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that
Chiarella had no fiduciary duty to the sellers of the securities.'0
4
The Court set out that liability under section 10(b) must be "premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction."' 05 Due to Chiarella's
situation of employment, the Court concluded that his use of the
nonpublic information could not be considered a fraud under section
1 0(b).-106
5. Dirks v. SEC
The revamping of insider trading law continued in Dirks v. SEC0 7
which involved disclosures of material nonpublic information by a
former officer of Equity Funding of America (Equity Funding) to
a broker-dealer. 08 The broker-dealer provided investment and port-
folio analysis of insurance companies' securities to institutional inves-
tors.' 0 9 The broker-dealer investigated Equity Funding and, in
accordance with information he had been given, found its corporate
assets to be severely overstated."10
During this time, the price of Equity Funding stock fell drastically,
and the firm subsequently went into receivership."' Before this oc-
curred, however, several of Dirks' clients and institutional investors
sold their Equity Funding shares based on their conversations with
Dirks, thereby averting substantial financial losses." 2
Noting the holding of Chiarella, that a duty to disclose or refrain
may not be found unless a fiduciary or other special relationship
exists between the parties to a transaction" 3 or unless the inside
information has been made available improperly,"' 4 the United States
Supreme Court held:
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he
cannot disclose, he must abstain from buying or selling." Id. (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original). For a detailed discussion of the "disclose or refrain rule,"
see supra notes 30-32, 39-46 and accompanying text.
104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. For a detailed discussion of Chiarella, see
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 11-16.
105. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
106. Id. at 233.
107. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
108. Id. at 648-49.
109. Id. at 648.
110. Id. at 649.
111. Id. at 650.
112. Id. at 649.
113. Id. at 654-55.
114. Id. at 660.
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[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a cor-
poration not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows
or should know that there has been a breach. 5
The Court defined the test for such a breach as "whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." '"1 6
It follows that, absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach.' 17 Hence, the Court concluded that Dirks did not violate
the provisions of section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5."18
6. United States v. Newman
After Chiarella was decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1980,"19 the Second Circuit, in United States v. Newman, 20 upheld
the prosecution of a trader for aiding and abetting Rule lOb-5
violations by brokerage house employees who had profited from
insider knowledge of mergers and takeovers.' 21
Newman, the defendant stocktrader, acquired confidential infor-
mation regarding proposed mergers and acquisitions. 2 2 He then con-
veyed the information to two confederates, who in turn purchased
stock in the merger and takeover targets, and thereby reaped sub-
stantial gains. 23 Newman held that a duty to disclose or refrain
from trading may be found absent a special relationship between
the parties to the transaction. 24 In dicta, the court specifically rejected
the theory that it is a requisite element under the securities laws
that fraud be perpetrated upon purchasers or sellers of securities. 125
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 662.
117. Id. "Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach."
Id.
118. Id. at 665-67.
119. For a discussion of Chiarella, see supra notes 98-106 and accompanying
text.
120. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id.
124. Newman, 664 F.2d at 20. But see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55; Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 230.
125. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Chiarella,
Justice Stevens stated that "a legitimate argument could be made that [Chiarella's]
actions constituted 'a fraud or a deceit' upon those companies 'in connection with
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D. Positive Aspects of Insider Trading
One commentator has noted that the arguments in favor of insider
trading fall into one of two categories: (1) no one is harmed by
insider trading and there are inherent benefits in such activity; and
(2) the inadequacy of the present structure prohibiting insider trading
mandates that a reorganization of the current system be undertaken. 26
Arguments falling into the first category contend that there is
"no causal connection between insider trading and outsiders' losses."' 127
One commentator suggests that, for this argument to stand, an
individual investor would have had to participate in a particular
trade irrespective of the insider's activity.2 8
Depending upon whether the underlying goal of securities regu-
lation is thought of in terms of investor protection or market ef-
ficiency, insider trading may be either a nemesis or a blessing. 29 If
insider trading is allowed, the action of insiders in the market will
move prices to their natural equilibrium. 30 Therefore, insider trading
the purchase or sale of any security' . . . . [It could also be argued that no
actionable violation of Rule lOb-5 had occurred." 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). According to the Newman decision, the dissent in
United States v. Chiarella is primarily based "upon the absence of a special relation-
ship between Chiarella and the sellers of the stock, the point which the Supreme
Court held to be determinative." Newman, 664 F.2d at 16 n.2. But see Chiarella,
588 F.2d at 1373-74 ("[tlhe majority terms 'irrelevant' the fact that Chiarella was
neither an insider of the companies whose securities he purchased, nor the tippee
of an insider. . . . 'The essential purpose of Rule lOb-5, as we have stated time
and again, is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair ad-
vantage of the uninformed outsiders'.") (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Radiation
Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)).
126. See An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 789. See
generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (prohibition
against insider trading ignores goals of allocative market efficiency).
127. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dooley]; see also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d
307 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding no causal connection between the defendant's purchases
and the plaintiff's lost opportunity in selling before favorable news), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
128. See Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-
5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 295-96 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Branson].
129. See Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, supra note 45, at
336.
130. See Branson, supra note 128, at 292.
For example, a corporation developing a new product which is subject
to governmental approval may receive advance notice that such approval
will be denied, a decision that would adversely affect the price of the
corporation's securities when made public. By permitting corporate in-
siders to sell their stock based on such information, the securities markets
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arguably may increase the efficiency of capital markets.' Moreover,
it has also been argued that removing prohibitions against insider
trading will act as an incentive for an issuer's officers to achieve
trading conditions for the issuer's securities which, as investors, they
can then exploit.3 2
The argument in the second category favoring insider trading is
that attempts to regulate insider trading have been grossly inade-
quate.'33 One commentator asserts that the problem lies in "the
futility of the SEC's goal of providing meaningful information equally
to all investors under a scheme of mandatory, standardized dis-
closure." 34
III. Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private
Transactions
In the world of high finance, the once obscure transaction known
as the leveraged buyout is now storming the market.' In this
transaction, corporate officers turn publicly-held firms into private
operations that are free from unwanted attention of corporate raiders
and from demands of short-term investors.'3 6 In addition, many
corporate officers are making huge profits for themselves and for
shareholders. 3 7
A. The Structure of the Transaction
The actual mechanics of going private are varied. 3 A leveraged
would begin to incorporate the adverse decision by setting a lower, more
accurate stock price. Potential investors in the corporation may be dis-
suaded from purchasing the stock as a result of the price movement
initiated by the insider trading.
An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 30, at 790 (footnote omitted).
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
132. Branson, supra note 128, at 291-92.
133. See id. at 293; Dooley, supra note 127, at 72; Note, The Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry,
29 ST . L. REv. 1031, 1059 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis].
134. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, supra note 133, at 1059.
135. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
136. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54. For a discussion of leveraged buyouts as
a defense tactic against hostile takeovers, see infra notes 159-61 and accompanying
text.
137. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54. For an example of profits made by officers,
see infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
138. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54-55. For a discussion of several variations
of leveraged buyout structures, see infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
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buyout involves leveraging, that is, borrowing from a financier to
acquire the target company.139 The funds obtained through borrowing
139. See DIAmoND, supra note 4, at 11; Greenwald, supra note 5, at 55. Leveraged
buyouts normally involve the purchase of either corporate assets or stock. Stock
acquisitions take on several structures including stock purchases, cash mergers,
redemptions, and tender offers. The following is an example of a stock purchase
of a subsidiary:
[A] lender (Lender) makes an unsecured loan to a newly formed holding
company (Holding) established for the purpose of entering into a stock
purchase agreement with the existing owner(s) (Seller) of the stock of
the target company (Target). Proceeds of Lender's initial loan are used
by Holding to purchase the stock of Target. Immediately after the closing
of the stock purchase, Lender makes a second loan, this time to Target.
The proceeds of this second loan are upstreamed to Holding (by dividend,
loan, or other distribution), and Holding uses the funds to repay the
first loan to Lender. The second loan is secured by liens on the assets
of Target.
DiAmoND, supra note 4, at 120-21.
In a cash merger ... an investing group forms Holding, which in turn
forms a wholly owned subsidiary (Acquisition Sub). Acquisition Sub and
Target enter into a merger agreement, following approval of their re-
spective boards of directors providing for (1) the merger of Acquisition
Sub into Target (Target being the survivor in the merger) and (2) the
conversion of the outstanding shares of stock of Target into the right
to receive cash at a specified dollar amount per share .... Immediately
following the consummation of the merger (which normally will require
shareholder approval before consummation can occur), Lender makes a
secured loan to Target in an amount at least sufficient to enable Target
to satisfy its obligations to its "former" shareholders under the merger
agreement to exchange their stock for cash. Following the merger, Target
becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of Holding; and often, in order to
achieve various tax benefits (e.g., a step-up in basis of the Target's fixed
assets for future depreciation deductions), the Target will be either wholly
or partially liquidated into Holding. This merger technique is often used
by investing groups to take publicly held corporations private.
Id. at 122 (emphasis in original).
In a typical redemption ... Lender makes a secured loan to Target to
enable Target to redeem the stock of one or more of Target's shareholders
.... [Tihe redemption vehicle is most often employed by closely held
corporations to purchase the stock of one or more of their shareholders.
Following the redemption, the redeemed stock is either held in the
corporate treasury or canceled, thereby increasing the percentage of out-
standing stock of Target held by each of Target's remaining shareholders.
Id. at 123.
In a typical tender offer,
[t]he investing group establishes Holding, which in turn forms Acquisition
Sub. Acquisition Sub makes a public tender offer for the stock of Target.
The offer provides that the obligation of Acquisition Sub to pay for the
tendered stock is conditioned upon (1) the tender of at least 80 percent
of Target's stock and (2) the posttender consummation of a cash merger
of Target with Acquisition Sub (Target being the survivor).
The tender offer further provides that after the tender offer but before
Acqusition Sub pays for the tendered shares, Acquisition Sub has the
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are used to pay the seller.140 Internal cash flow generated by the
target and/or redeployment of the target's assets are used to retire
the debt.'4 The buyers and sellers of target companies can also be
varied in their motives and their approaches. 42
Basically, the techniques used in recent attempts to go private fall
into two categories: (1) a "one-step acquisition" of publicly held
securities,4 3 typically through a merger;'4 4 and (2) a "two-step acqui-
sition,' '1 45 which usually involves a tender offer followed by, if
right to vote the tendered shares in favor of the merger. If less than
80 percent of Target's voting stock is tendered or if for any reason the
merger of Acquisition Sub into Target is not consummated by a date
certain, the shares are required to be returned to the tendering share-
holders. This structure enhances the ability of the investing group to
"freeze out" the 20 percent minority interest in Target and to permit
Lender to determine whether Acquisition Sub's tender offer is successful
before Lender's loan is made. In this structure Lender does not make
its secured loan to Target until after the merger takes place.
Id. at 123-24 (emphasis in original).
Asset acquisitions, on the other hand, usually involve a much less complicated
structure. See supra note 4 for a discussion of asset acquisitions. For a detailed
discussion of asset acquisition structures including the legal problems which they
may generate, see DIAMOND, supra note 4, at 124-25.
140. DLIAMOND, supra note 4, at 11.
141. Id.
142. See Going Private, supra note 6, at 905-09; see also DIAMOND, supra note
4, at I I (priorities must include determining quality and size of potential firm for
purchase, matching a deal with target screen, locating the seller, determining the
seller's goal, and demonstrating to the seller the mutual beneficiality of the deal).
143. The "one-step" merger is less complex than its "two-step" counterpart. As
an illustration of a "one-step" merger, one commentator offers the following
scenario: assume Firm A is seeking to go private by merging into Firm B, which
owns 44 percent of Firm A's stock. Firm B is owned in its entirety by a group
of officers and directors of Firm A. In accordance with the terms of the proposed
merger, as determined by the common directors of A and B, only Firm A's
shareholders will receive cash, and Firm B, as the surviving corporation, will change
its name to Firm A. Going Private, supra note 6, at 909-10 (pointing out that
pursuant to Delaware law, merger must be approved for each merging corporation
by a majority of that corporation's voting stock, but, since Firm B owns 44 percent
of Firm A's stock, approval can be expected). See supra notes 138-42 and accom-
panying text and infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
various acquisition structures.
144. See supra note 143.
145. A "two-step" method that begins with a tender offer by a corporation to
its public shareholders, followed by a "mop-up" of any remaining publicly held
shares, is the more common method of going private. See Going Private, supra
note 6, at 910. "Tender offers .. .require no approval by shareholders as a group.
Instead, their success is dependent upon the decision of individual shareholders;
and to overcome shareholder inertia companies have regularly fixed the tender price
above, and sometimes as much as double, that obtainable in the market immediately
before the tender offer was announced." Id. (footnotes omitted). For a discussion
[Vol. XIV
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
necessary, one of several "mop-up" devices.146
The propensity for leveraged buyout, management buyout, and
going private transactions undoubtedly is rising consistently.' 47 The
forecast "that managerial buy-outs will increase in direct proportion
to the rate of takeover activity" is supported by empirical evidence.1 4s
Leveraged buyouts represent a significant percentage of all corporate
acquisitions. 49 Some estimates indicate that leveraged buyouts may
have comprised fifty percent of all corporate acquisitions completed
in 1983.110 These predictions and estimates are not far off the mark.
For example, a record $10.8 billion was spent to take publicly-held
of various acquisition structures, see supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text
and infra note 146 and accompanying text.
146. If a tender offer does not prove to be completely successful, corporate
officers who are anxious to take the company private have several "mop-up"
techniques at their disposal. One such technique is a "reverse stock split" whereby
the company issues one new share, for example, in exchange for every 1000 old
ones. See Going Private, supra note 6, at 910. This results in all shareholders with
less than 1000 shares, or some multiple of 1000, holding fractional amounts of
stock in the corporation and since a corporation can usually buy out fractional
shares unilaterally, reverse stock splits can effectively eliminate remaining minority
interests. Id. A second "mop-up" technique is for majority shareholders to "freeze
out" the remaining minority through a merger. Id. at 911. If the majority controls
almost all of the outstanding stock, it may take advantage of popular short-form
merger statutes. Id. In a short-form merger, the majority sets up a new corporation
as the parent of the corporation going private and merges the latter into the former;
however, short-form mergers do not require shareholder approval. Id.
"Freeze-out" has been defined as follows:
In its broadest sense, it might be taken to describe any action by those
in control of the corporation which results in the termination of a
stockholder's interest in the enterprise .... The term has come to imply
a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of the stockholder's shares, not
incident to some other wholesome business goal.
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HAgv.
L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964) (emphasis in original) (citing O'NEAL & DERWIN,
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 3 (1961)).
147. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical As-
sessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1197 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Coffee]; Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54-
55.
148. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1197. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying
text for a discussion of estimated figures for leveraged buyouts.
149. A report by W.T. Grimm & Co. states that of the 694 divestitures that
took place during the first three quarters of 1983, "104-or 15 percent-were
leveraged buyouts." Legal Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 8, col. I.
150. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1197. The managing director of Merrill
Lynch Capital Markets predicted that leveraged buyouts would account "for up
to 50% of all corporate acquisitions in 1983, compared with 15% to 20% in 1982."
Id. at 1197 n.149; see Hill & Williams, Buyout Boom: Leveraged Purchases of
Firms Keep Gaining Despite Rising Risks, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1983, at 1, col.
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firms private in 1984, versus just $636 million in 1979.151 The 1985
pace was even more furious. 5 2
The factors for the attractiveness of leveraged buyouts are even
more diverse than the techniques employed to structure them." 3 The
most compelling factor is the potential for profit. 54 For example,
in 1982, a group of investors led by then Treasury Secretary William
Simon invested $1 million of personal capital and borrowed $79
million to buy the Gibson greeting card company from RCA. 55 The
Simon group turned Gibson into a private corpoartion and reor-
ganized its operations. 5 6 Then, only 18 months later, the Simon
group sold $290 million worth of the firm's stock to the public.' 7
William Simon alone earned more than $15 million and found himself
holding shares in Gibson worth about $50 million.'58
Leveraged/management buyouts often have been used as a weapon
to defend against hostile takeovers.5 9 As one commentator points
out, "[t]he enhanced danger of ouster under a regime of frequent
takeovers threatens the senior management group with the potential
151. See Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54. Some leveraged buyouts, either completed
or being negotiated at the time of the writing of this Note include:
COMPANY TRANSACTION DATE VALUE IN BILLIONS
Beatrice Apr. '86 $4.91
R.H. Macy July '86 $3.58
Continental Group Nov. '84 $2.75
Storer Communications Dec. '85 $2.5
Union Texas Petroleum (50%) July '85 $1.7
Levi Strauss Aug. '85 $1.48
Northwest Industries July '85 $1.37
City Investing (3 subs.) Dec. '84 $1.25
Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see Going Private, supra note 6, at 905-09.
154. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 54; see HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 611;
Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIo
ST. L.J. 515, 533 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Buxbaum]; Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 6, at 706.
155. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 55.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. One commentator argues that buyouts of this type "invariably increase
the value of the stock that executives had before the deal." Id. After this type
of buyout, the management generally holds a great deal more of the private company
than it did of the public one and thus it can collect a greater percentage of divi-
dends distributed by the company. Id. Moreover, as was the case with William
Simon, the owners can reap heavy gains if they later decide to sell stock to the
public again, assuming the public is willing to buy. See supra notes 155-57 and
accompanying text.
159. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1195-99.
[Vol. XIV
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
loss of what they predictably see as their legitimate entitlement to
share in the future earnings and stock appreciation of the firm."' ' 0
Thus, target management may be able to preempt the potential
contest for control by taking the firm private.' 6'
There are other formidable business reasons for taking a company
private. 62 Free from the ever-pressing need to satisfy impatient Wall
Street stock market analysts and short-term shareholders who often
demand increasing profits each quarter, corporate management can
focus on long-term goals. 63 By doing this, a firm's future investment
can be used to speculate on long-term market trends and fluctua-
tions. '6
Finally, going private transactions are encouraged by United States
tax laws.' 65 The Internal Revenue Code permits investors to deduct
the interest on their debts.'6 This makes substantial borrowing ex-
tremely attractive because an interest expenditure generates a cor-
responding decrease in taxable income and the government thereby
shares the cost of the borrowing. 67
160. Id. at 1196.
161. Id.
162. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
163. See Greenwald, supra note 5, at 55. "Going private gives us the opportunity
to get out of the fishbowl and to make marketing decisions in a longer time frame
than a public company has. Sometimes you need to invest in the future, and
sometimes the future is more than 90 days away." Id. (quoting Dean Meadors,
spokesman for Mary Kay Cosmetics).
164. See id.
165. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
166. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1985).
167. See Greenwald, supra note 5, at 55. As a case in point, the recent activity
of Goldome may be examined. Goldome has 17 dealmakers who specialize in
leveraged buyouts mainly for tax reasons. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985 § 3 (Business),
at F9, col. 1. Goldome is such a partner. Id. In the last 18 months, Goldome
participated in 20 such deals. Id. The targets are companies with annual sales of
between $70 million and $140 million. Id.
Goldome sets up subsidiaries that make highly leveraged equity investments
in the target companies .... [T]he bank could ultimately earn $100
million on a $1 million investment. Under a typical transaction, in return
for its equity investment, 90 percent of the company's profits are allocated
to Goldome for the first five years, and 10 percent for the next 25 years.
But in the first five years, Goldome receives no cash, although it can
include the allocated profits in the bank's net income. It need not pay
taxes on that income, however, because it can charge those profits against
Goldome losses from previous years.
Id. Ten million dollars of such profits were included in Goldome's net income in
1984, and that figure was expected to double in 1985 and reach $35 million in
1986. Id.
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
B. Fiduciary Duty and the Equal Treatment of Security Holders
It is an accepted tenet that corporate directors and other managers
are fiduciaries, and therefore, must behave in an upright manner
toward the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.' 68 Fiduciary principles
restrict the ability of corporate managers to line their own pockets
at the security holders' expense. 169 They also encompass anti-theft
directives and constraints on conflicts of interest. 70 It is argued that
management buyout transactions "may violate management's fidu-
ciary obligation to administer corporate affairs for the exclusive
benefit of the corporation and the corporation's shareholders.' '17'
168. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del. 1977), overruled
on other grounds, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See generally
Brudney, supra note 6, at 1114 ("investors have reason to expect equal treatment
in distributions or reorganizations which are simply internal reshuffles, it would
take a powerful case of net social gain to justify denying such treatment"); Brudney,
A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1975) (fiduciary strictures
governing behavior of management and controlling stockholders apply to going
private transactions) [hereinafter cited as A Note on Going Private]; Coffee, supra
note 147, at 1150 ("fiduciary duties are typically enforced through derivative actions
...."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 700 ("[clorporate directors and
other managers.are said to be fiduciaries, who must behave in certain upright ways
toward the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties"); Going Private, supra note 6, at 914
("[aln insider's fiduciary duty prevents him from exercising corporate powers, no
matter how absolute on the surface they are, if the effect is simply to enrich
himself at the expense of the minority").
169. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 700.
Fiduciary principles govern agency relationships. An agency relationship
is an agreement in which one or more persons (the principal) delegates
authority to another person (the agent) to perform some service on the
principal's behalf. The entire corporate structure is a web of agency
relationships. Investors delegate authority to directors, who subdelegate
to upper managers, and so on.
Id.
170. Id. at 702.
171. Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1017 (footnote omitted); see United States
v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972) (majority shareholders and corporate directors owe
fiduciary duty to all shareholders not to misuse power by promoting personal
interests); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 312 (1949) (standard
of loyalty that will prevent conflict of interest from arising must be applied by
courts to corporate fiduciaries); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943)
(Court insists on "scrupulous observance" of management's fiduciary obligations).
State law generally governs the fiduciary obligations of officers of corporations.
See Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702-03 (2d Cir.) (court refers to laws of
state of incorporation to determine fiduciary obligations), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
885 (1962). States have strictly construed statutes mandating management's fiduciary
duty to the corporation and the corporation's shareholders. See, e.g., Herald Co.
v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (under Colorado law, corporate
officers function as agents of corporation and thereby stand in quasi-fiduciary relation
to shareholders); Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 82, 190 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1972)
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The argument stands for the proposition that even if the best interests
of the corporation's security holders are served by going private,
the dual role of buyer and seller which management plays is suspect
because there is a conflict between management's obligation to obtain
the highest price available for public shareholders and the interest
of management in acquiring the corporation for the lowest price
available.172 The greatest possible conflict arises when management
unilaterally sets the price of sale and repurchase. 73 Nevertheless,
serious questions regarding the propriety of the management buyout
process have been raised. 7 4 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel
suggest a large scope in determining to whom the fiduciary duty is
owed. 75 They urge that corporate fiduciaries should seek to maximize
shareholder wealth generally and not just to maximize the returns
to their specific shareholders. 76 The breadth of fiduciary duty that
such an argument calls for would create a situation where corporate
directors could not pursue a gain if its realization would impose
greater costs upon society. 177 Thus, one can see why "It]his line of
argument quickly converts the corporate director into an unelected
and unaccountable public servant."' 178
One aspect of fiduciary duty is the equal treatment of investors,
and both statutory law and case law undoubtedly mandate that equal
(corporate officers stand in fiduciary relationship to shareholders); Shermer v. Baker,
2 Wash. App. 845, 851, 472 P.2d 589, 593-94 (1970) (fiduciary duty of corporate
officers requires utmost good faith and undivided loyalty to corporation and every
shareholder).
172. See A Note on "Going Private," supra note 168, at 1029-30; Corporate
Morality, supra note 46, at 1017-18.
173. This is the case of "one-step" and "two-step" mergers. One and two step
mergers that eliminate public shareholders are referred to as either "takeout mergers"
or "freezeouts" since these transactions give management the ability to compel
minority shareholders to accept cash rather than an equity interest in the newly
formed corporation. See Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1019-20. For a
further discussion of "one-step" and "two-step" merger transactions, see supra
notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
175. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 711-15 (fiduciary duty is owed
to market generally). But see Coffee, supra note 147, at 1216-21 (the logic underlying
proposed radical reformulation of fiduciary duties is flawed).
176. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 708-15. But see Chiarella, 445
U.S. at .230 (violations of section 10(b) must be "premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction").
For a further discussion of Chiarella, see supra notes 98-106 and accompanying
text.
177. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1217. "Such a rule, if intended, might also
deny directors the ability to close or relocate an industrial plant if the private gains
were less than the social loss." Id.
178. Id.
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amounts or values be distributed, per share, to security holders of
a single class upon dissolution of the enterprise. 79 The form of the
argument is in three steps: (1) "fiduciary principles require fair
conduct;" (2) "equal treatment is fair conduct; hence," (3) "fiduciary
principles require equal treatment."'8 0 The conclusion, however, does
not follow.''
[I]f the terms under which the directors obtain control of the
firm call for them to maximize the wealth of the investors, their
duty is to select the highest-paying venture and, following that,
to abide by the rules of distribution. If unequal distribution is
necessary to make the stakes higher, then duty requires ine-
quality. 
2
In a leveraged/management buyout transaction, it is argued that
"[flair treatment of the displaced stockholders requires not only that
179. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 1079; see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 502(b) (McKinney 1963) (requiring a "ratable" payment of preferred shares in
liquidation); Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719, 722 (W.D.
Ark. 1964) (after providing for corporate debts and liabilities, remaining assets
should be distributed in cash or in kind to former stockholders in proportion to
their stock ownership); Zimmermann v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 61 Cal.
App. 2d 585, 143 P.2d 409, 412 (1943) (legislature, through silence, has decided
that minority shareholders cannot be compelled to accept cash for their interests
upon voluntary dissolution of corporation); G. SEWARD & W.J. NAUSS, JR., BAsic
CORPORATE PRACTICE 273 (2d ed. 1977) ("[in the majority of jurisdictions, no
appraisal remedy is provided in the event of dissolution; and stockholders share
proportionately in the net corporate assets remaining after the satisfaction of creditors
and liquidation preferences and other rights").
180. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 703.
181. Id. For example:
A corporation may choose to invest its capital in one of two ventures.
Venture 1 will pay $100, and the returns can be divided equally among
the firm's investors. Thus, if there are 10 investors in the firm, the
expected value to each investor is $10. Venture 2 will pay $150, in
contrast, but only if the extra returns are given wholly to five of the
ten investors. Thus, five "lucky" investors will receive $20 apiece, and
the unlucky ones $10. Because each investor has a 50 percent chance of
being lucky, each would think Venture 2 to be worth $15. The directors
of the firm should choose Venture 2 over Venture 1 because it has the
higher value and because none of the investors is worse off under Venture
2.
Now consider Venture 3, in which $200 in gains are to be divided among
only five of the ten investors with nothing for the rest. If investors are
risk neutral, fiduciaries should choose Venture 3 over Venture 2 (despite
the fact that some investors end up worse off under Venture 3), because
the expected value to each investor is $20 under Venture 3 and only $15
under Venture 2.
Id. at 703-04.
182. Id. at 704. For an example where ex post inequality would be both fair and
desirable, see supra note 181.
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they be given the value they are compelled to surrender but also
that they be given a share of the increment or of the opportunity
which the insiders acquire by forcing them out."'' 3
This argument is useful, but ultimately it is misleading. The fi-
duciary principle provides that gains realized from corporate control
transactions need not be shared as long as each investor receives
compensation equalling what he had before.'14 Generally, the fi-
duciary principle is satisfied if investors do not suffer a loss, even
though some investors receive a premium over the market price of
their securities."8 5 Several commentators claim that the fiduciary
principle should be interpreted "as not permitting insiders unilaterally
to condemn the stock of public investors . . . no matter how high
the condemnation price."'18 6 These same commentators, however,
offer no specific explanation as to why security holders should be
forced to hold onto their securities when they can realize financial
gains as a result of a value-increasing going private corporate control
transaction. 187
C. Rule 13e-3
Rule 13e-3,88 which has been adopted by the SEC, addresses the
going private, leveraged buyout, and management buyout phenom-
ena. 89 As originally proposed, the Rule would have required that
a going private transaction be procedurally and substantively fair to
minority shareholders. 90 The substantive aspect of this regulation
183. See A Note on Going Private, supra note 168, at 1025; cf. Ervin v. Oregon
Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F. 625, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) (minority stockholders
"may justly complain because the majority, while occupying a fiduciary relation
towards the minority, have exercised their powers in a way to buy the property
for themselves, and exclude the minority from a fair participation in the fruits of
the sale"), appeal dismissed, 136 U.S. 645 (1890); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take Overs, 88 H, v. L. REv. 297, 298 (1974)
("the parent stands in a fiduciary relationship to the subsidiary's public stockholders,
which creates a special obligation to deal fairly with them when acquiring their
interest"). But cf. Christiana Sec. Co., SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 8615,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder], FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,054 (Dec. 13, 1974).
184. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 731.
185. See id.
186. Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1367 (1978) (emphasis in original).
187. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 730.
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
189. Id.
190. The proposed rule stated: "It shall be unlawful ... to engage ... in a
Rule 13e-3 transaction unless . .. the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair to unaffiliated
19861
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was greatly criticized because it exceeded the rulemaking authority
of the SEC.' 9' When Rule 13e-3 was adopted in August, 1979, the
purely substantive requirement that the transaction be "fair" was
eliminated; 92 however, Rule 13e-3, as adopted, requires "the issuer
to disclose whether it reasonably believes the transaction is fair or
unfair to minority shareholders." 93
In disclosing its reasonable belief, an issuer must also disclose,
"in reasonable detail," the "material factors" upon which the belief
security-holders... ." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, 42 Fed. Reg.
60,090 (1977).
191. See 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979); HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 613; Note,
Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 782,
783 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regulating Going Private].
192. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979),
reprinted in 17 SEC Docket 1449 (Aug. 2, 1979); see Regulating Going Private,
supra note 191, at 783.
193. Schedule 13E-3, item 8(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 46,745 (1979), reprinted in 17 SEC
Docket 1466 (Aug. 2, 1979). The disclosure requirements of Rule 13e-3 relating to
the fairness of the transaction have been summarized as follows:
2. Substantial information concerning the transaction and those who
propose it is also required. This includes the material terms of the
transaction and any term or arrangement relating to any security holder
of the issuer which is not identical to that relating to other security
holders of the same class. The plans or proposals of the issuer or affiliate
regarding certain subsequent activities are also required ...
3. The source and amount of funds or other considerations to be used
must be disclosed, along with a statement of all expenses incurred or
expected to be incurred, and the disclosure of the provisions of any loan
or financing arrangements with respect to the funds to be used as
consideration for the transaction. A statement of the purposes of the
transaction must be made as well as a discussion of any alternative means
which the issuer or affiliate may have considered and the reasons for
their rejection. There must be a statement of the reasons for the structure
of the transaction and its timing, as well as the effects of the transaction
on the issuer, its affiliates and unaffiliated security holders, including
federal tax consequences. There is a specific requirement for detailed
discussion of the benefits and detriments of the transaction to the various
interested parties, with quantification to the extent possible.
4. The fairness of the transaction must be discussed in detail. After
receipt of negative comments on earlier Commission proposals that would
require that the transaction be fair, the Commission fell back upon its
unquestioned right to demand disclosure of material factors pertaining
to a proposed transaction, and concluded that fairness was such a factor.
Accordingly, the issuer or affiliate must state whether it believes that
the transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders. Infor-
mation concerning dissents or abstentions by any director in making this
determination must be indicated. Material aspects of the transaction upon
which the belief as to fairness is based must be given, including the
weight assigned to each such aspect. Various aspects which may be
considered include: current market price, historical market prices, net
book value, going concern value, liquidation value, the purchase price
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is based and the weight assigned to each factor.'9 However, a fairness
opinion from an independent financial institution, reflecting a pre-
sumption of good faith pursuant to the business judgment standard,
serves the fiduciary's purpose of justifying the fairness of the trans-
action and the fiduciary's conduct in its execution. 95
Skeptics of Rule 13e-3 have questioned whether it actually protects
minority security holders.?96 Several scholars assert that the Rule
does not promote the welfare of security holders. 97 One commentator
paid in previous purchases, any report, opinion or appraisal, and any
firm offers for acquisitions by unaffiliated parties. (A proposed amend-
ment would limit this additional detail to transactions which are believed
by the issuer or affiliate to be fair to unaffiliated security holders. It
would also inquire as to whether or not the issuer has furnished such
projections during the preceding eighteen months to a person who has
made a loan desribed in the schedule or to a person who has filed a
report, opinion or appraisal described in the schedule, including iden-
tification of a person to whom such projections were furnished, a brief
description of the reason for furnishing them to the person and the uses
to which they were put, and a fair and accurate summary of the pro-
jections. If adopted, 'copies of the projections would be required to be
filed as an exhibit to the schedule.)
5. If a report, opinion or appraisal from an outside party has been
obtained, disclosure must be made and described, along with any material
relationship of the outside party to the issuer or its affiliates. If the
report deals with fairness of the consideration, a statement must be made
as to whether the issuer or affiliate determined the amount of consideration
to be paid or whether the outside party recommended it. A fairly detailed
summary of the report must be given. And the report itself must be
made available for inspection and copying by any interested equity security
holder or his representative.
Guidelines on Going Private, supra note 12, at 329-30 (Appendix A) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
194. Schedule 13E-3, item 8(b).
Requiring the issuer to disclose the weight assigned to the various factors
it considered in arriving at its belief of fairness seems to place a heavy
burden on the issuer with little benefit to the shareholder. In many cases
it will be impossible to gauge the weight assigned in the decision making
process to the various factors, and even if it were possible it seems
unlikely that disclosure of the relative importance of the factors to the
issuer will aid the shareholders in their own decisionmaking.
Regulating Going Private, supra note 191, at 785 n.30.
195. See Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1036.
196. See HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 614; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
6, at 729 n.83; Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1035.
197.
The rule "requires either a statement that the transaction is unfair (which
will lead to an injunction under Singer) or a statement that the transaction
is fair, which can be challenged in federal court as a material and untrue
statement. The damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't quality of the
Rule makes it an obstacle to the achievement of shareholders' " welfare.
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goes so far as to argue that the broad scope of Rule 13e-3 is not
authorized by any statute. 98
D. Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private
Transactions: The Risks Involved
As with almost any financial transaction, leveraged buyout, man-
agement buyout, and going private transactions involve a certain
degree of risk.' 99 In the case of management buyouts, management
has an incentive to exploit its superior access to information and
to purchase its own firm at a bargain price, even when a takeover
is not imminent. 2°° However, if a hostile takeover is not imminent,
management often restrains from engaging in such a buyout because
of the enormous financial risk associated with holding an undiv-
ersified portfolio which is severely over-invested in a single invest-
ment. 20 1 Moreover, the recent increase in buyouts, in direct
correspondence to an increase in takeover threats, suggests that
economically attractive opportunities to go private based on material
inside information 02 have not been previously exploited by man-
agements .203
To explain management buyout transactions by saying that man-
agement is acting on inside information has a certain conspiratorial
appeal; however, it ignores the fact that inside information can also
be a negative factor if future prospects are bleak.2°4 In addition,
the inside information-conspiracy theory completely overlooks several
formidable considerations. First, to arrange the intricate financing,
prepare the necessary proxy material and consummate the transaction
may take as long as a year. 205 It would be extremely difficult to
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 729 n.83; see Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (going private transactions must meet an "entire
fairness" standard and serve valid business purpose) (dictum). The business purpose
requirement enunciated in Singer has been eliminated. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
198. See Regulating Going Private, supra note 191, at 788-98.
199. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 728 ("[wlhat if the merger
results in a loss rather than a gain?").
200. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1196.
201. Id. at 1197.
202. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
203. See Coffee, supra note 147, at 1197, n.148. For a discussion of the recent
increase in buyouts including those whose purpose is to defend against hostile
takeovers, see supra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
204. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 296 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Lowenstein].
205. Id. at 296-97.
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keep clandestine any but the most long-term expectations-which
are, at best, speculative. 206 Second, the inside information theory
ignores the fact that as the rewards of taking a firm private became
more and more apparent, institutional investors and major banking
firms were drawn in as buyers. 2 7 One commentator notes that "[t]his
fact, increasing institutionalization, and exacting disclosure regula-
tions were simply not conducive to the planning and financing of
large company acquisitions by conspiracy." 201
IV. Recommendations
Although this Note argues that insider trading2°9 is an unlikely
explanation for the propensity of buyers to engage in leveraged
buyout, management buyout, and going private transactions,210 there
are those who disagree.211 Moreover, there is disagreement as to how
such transactions should be treated. 212
A. The Pros and Cons of Leveraged Buyout, Management
Buyout, and Going Private Transactions
It has been suggested that current rules be replaced with doctrines
of equitable sharing or even absolute bans on the allocation of
opportunities to parent corporations or corporate managers. 213 In
206. Id. "Indeed, if it consisted of news relating not to the corporation specifically
but to the industry as a whole, as is often the case, it would already have made
the rounds." Id.
207. See id. For an example of exacting disclosure regulations, see the discussion
of Rule 13e-3 supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
208. Lowenstein, supra note 204, at 297. "In any event, the businesses that go
private generally have dependable cash flows on which debt repayment can be
confidently built. They are almost uniformly prosaic businesses rather than ones
in which major discoveries or new advantages, other than those achieved by close
attention to operations, are likely." Id.
209. For a discussion of the history of insider trading, including pertinent case
law as well as arguments that insider trading may be economically beneficial, see
supra notes 26-134 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 6, at 1094 n.60 ("[tlhe misuse of inside
information in going private transactions is most likely to occur in the case of the
smaller companies for which going private is most feasible . . ."); Buxbaum, supra
note 154, at 533 ("[wjhat remains, other than an explanation suggesting the presence
of an organizational surplus which had not previously been reflected in share prices,
and which now is used by management to buy out the outside ownership interest?").
But see Lowenstein, supra note 204, at 296-97 ("the inside information-conspiracy
explanation overlooks several considerations").
212. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
213. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 679-83 (1974).
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fact, several scholars claim that the possibility that management will
overreach is so great that only complete prohibition can protect the
interests of security holders. 2 4 Such proposals, however, will deter
the undertaking of some value-increasing ventures, or, alternatively,
cause them to be undertaken inefficiently. 215
Conversely, there are those who recommend that the structure of
leveraged buyout, management buyout, and going private transactions
be left undisturbed.2 6 They argue that "the fiduciary principle should
incorporate a wealth maximization standard, that an unequal division
of gains from corporate control transactions facilitates wealth max-
imization, and that corporation law almost never requires gain shar-
ing.,, 217
There is also one commentator who advocates a more moderate
approach. This commentator recommends that leveraged buyout,
management buyout, and going private transactions should continue,
provided that state courts invoke a test of intrinsic fairness not-
withstanding the absence of financial proof of self-dealing by the
purchaser.2 18
B. An Alternative Proposal
In a transaction involving corporate control, certain minimum
payments must be given to those investors who are affected by the
transaction.2 9 Pursuant to these appraisal rights, the investors must
receive the equivalent of what they give up, but they should not
receive any share of the gain obtained from the change in control. 2 0
Moreover, the judicial process of financial examination and valuation
cannot be guaranteed to produce accurate appraisals.Y'
214. See Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 997, 1023 (1981); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 733.
215. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 733.
216. See id. at 698 (those producing gain should be allowed to keep it).
217. Id. at 737. "In general, the law is congruent with shareholders' interests
in this regard; 'fairness' plays little role in the fiduciary principle, and perhaps it
should play none." Id.
218. See Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1042 ("[s]ince buyout transactions
present a clear potential for self-dealing, state courts should be willing to invoke
the intrinsic fairness standard without financial proof of self-dealing to the detriment
of minority shareholders").
219. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 731.
220. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1981) (providing that courts
"shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation" of the event giving rise
to the appraisal) (emphasis added).
221. See Corporate Morality, supra note 46, at 1041-42.
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Instead, the control group should be allowed to make its offer,
which usually will be at a premium over market price. 222 Minority
shareholders should be allowed to engage private financial analysts
to calculate what they consider to be a fair price while taking into
consideration a potential increase in value resulting from the trans-
action. Both prices may then be submitted to arbitration, 223 with
the stipulation that the arbitrator, who would be chosen by both
the control group and the minority shareholders, must choose one
of the two proferred prices, that is, a figure representing a com-
promise would be unacceptable. In addition, an arbitrator would be
employed only at the request of the minority shareholders, who
would have to agree to a ten percent deduction from the control
group's original offer should the arbitrator select the control group's
figure.
The threat of a ten percent deduction will deter the minority
shareholders from seeking arbitration with any figure that is un-
reasonable or grossly inaccurate. The possibility that an arbitrator
may choose a considerably higher figure submitted by the minority
shareholders will deter the control group from making any unrea-
sonably low initial offer. The result will be "fairness" without the
prohibition of potentially value-increasing transactions.
222. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 728-31 ("[a] freezeout price
above the current market price is no less beneficial to shareholders because the
price was once higher, and the person paying the above-market price cannot hope
to profit unless the transaction is value-increasing").
223. Under the United States Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (1982), agreements to arbitrate future disputes are, in general, specifically en-
forceable. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FoRDHAM URa. L.J.,
3, 4 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Katsoris]. Arbitration provides the needed advantage
of speedy dispute resolution by persons knowledgeable in the area, without excessive
costs. See id. at 3. In Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the nonwaiver provision of section 14 of the Securities Act
of 1933, in conjunction with the special rights provision of section 12 and the
special process and forum provisions of section 22, implicitly repealed the Arbitration
Act with regard to securities claims arising under the 1933 Act. Wilko, 346 U.S.
at 438; Katsoris, supra at 6. However, the United States Supreme Court has yet
to decide whether the Wilko prohibition as to 1933 Act claims also applies to the
far more numerous claims by the public under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See Katsoris, supra at 8. One scholar, in addition to the author of this Note,
argues that Wilko should not apply to the 1934 Act. Id.
Securities arbitration provides a forum for the fair, inexpensive and speedy
resolution of disputes. Id. at 15. Perhaps it should be the foremost method of
settling securities disputes. As one scholar notes, "[i]f that requires some adjustments
by the securities industry-so be it." Id.
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V. Conclusion
Certainly, leveraged buyout, management buyout, and going pri-
vate transactions are hallmarks of our modern entrepreneurial system.
Banning such transactions because of the risk of exploitation of
inside information would be not only irrational, but a solution far
worse than the problem.22 4 By affording minority security holders
a remedy should they feel they are being grossly exploited, 2 2 value-
increasing leveraged buyout, management buyout, and going private
transactions will be perpetuated while the principle of fiduciary duty22 6
remains untarnished.
Patrick S. Dunleavy
224. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 731.
225. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 168-87 and accompanying text.
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